Blueprints of Disaster: What the George Collapse Reveals About South African Construction

[Nat Quinn]

The 2024 George Building Collapse: A Case Study in Regulatory Failure and Professional Negligence

The catastrophic collapse of a multi-storey residential building under construction in George, South Africa on 6 May 2024, has exposed grave irregularities in the country’s building sector. Thirty-four construction workers were killed and 28 injured when the five-story structure, known as the Neo Victoria apartment project, suddenly caved in.

Background: The George Building Collapse of May 2024

On 6 May 2024, a partially built apartment block on Victoria Street in George (Western Cape) collapsed during construction. The project – a private development to create a block of flats – had reached four or five storeys when it crumbled, trapping dozens of workers. Rescue teams spent days sifting the rubble. The final death toll was 34, with many more severely injured.

Project Participants: The development, informally called “Neo Victoria”, was being built by Liatel Developments (the main contractor) on behalf of Neo Victoria Properties (the developer). The appointed structural and civil engineering firm was Mitchell & Associates, led by engineer Atholl Mitchell, who also served as the project’s principal agent (overall project manager) (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com). The project architect of record was Deon van der Westhuizen Architects cc, which had designed the building plans and obtained the municipal building plan approval (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com). A quantity surveying firm and other specialists were also on the team. Under a typical construction contract (such as JBCC in South Africa), the principal agent is often the architect, responsible for coordinating the professional team and administering the building contract. In this case, however, the engineer’s firm assumed the principal agent role, effectively diminishing the architect’s oversight during construction. This unusual arrangement became a critical factor in the lack of checks and balances on site.

Immediate Aftermath: The site was declared a crime scene as police, forensic engineers, and government agencies launched investigations (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ). Early signs indicated serious structural weaknesses – survivors and officials noted that the building’s lower levels had exhibited cracks prior to the collapse (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). President Cyril Ramaphosa visited the site and offered condolences, calling for answers and accountability (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). As the dust settled, attention turned to why the building had collapsed – revealing a litany of irregularities in violation of South Africa’s building laws and professional standards.

Systemic Failures and Irregularities Exposed

Inadequate Regulatory Oversight (NHBRC and Building Control)

From the outset, the project suffered from critical lapses in regulatory oversight, particularly by the National Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC). The NHBRC is mandated by the Housing Consumers Protection Measures Act of 1998 to ensure that new housing construction meets prescribed quality standards, primarily through requiring builders to register and enroll each project, and by conducting stage inspections (10 months later, where is the full George Building collapse report?). In the George project, these safeguards failed entirely:

• Improper Project Enrollment: Despite being a multi-storey development, the building was not properly enrolled with the NHBRC as such. In fact, the project was initially registered with the NHBRC as a single-storey structure – a gross misrepresentation given plans for a five-floor block (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament) (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). This appears to have been a deliberate tactic by the developer to cut costs; the developer “didn’t have enough money to register the Victoria Street building as a multi-storey building,” according to the Human Settlements Minister (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). Under law, a project must be enrolled with the NHBRC at least 15 days before construction begins, but in this case enrollment was done late and incorrectly – the building was only enrolled eight days after construction had already started, and then only as a single-level build (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). In other words, work on additional storeys proceeded without the required NHBRC approval or warranty coverage for a multi-floor structure.

• Missing Documents and Plan Changes: The NHBRC gave this project a green light despite key documentation being incomplete or missing. Structural design drawings and calculations – mandatory for ensuring a building’s stability – were lacking in the enrollment application (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). In a normal process, the NHBRC would reject an incomplete application, but here officials approved it regardless. In fact, NHBRC staff allowed the project’s plans to be changed from one storey to multiple storeys without a fresh review or proper approval (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). This indicates a breakdown of internal controls: as Minister Thembi Simelane-Nkadimeng reported, the NHBRC’s digital system should prevent advancement of an application until all “mandatory requirements” are met, yet someone bypassed the system (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). Investigators found that an official’s login credentials were used (while she was on leave) to unlawfully push through the enrollment for the multi-storey plans (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). In short, normal oversight processes were subverted from within, allowing construction to proceed on an expanded design that had never been properly vetted by the regulator.

• Lack of Inspections: Once construction was underway, the NHBRC failed to perform its duty of conducting regular site inspections. As later presented in Parliament, the council did not ensure that stage inspections took place to verify compliance on the ground (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament) (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). Had inspections occurred, glaring issues might have been caught (for example, significant cracking in structural elements was reportedly observed early on (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament)). Instead, with paperwork rubber-stamped and no on-site checks, the project went on unchecked until the fatal collapse. Notably, the local municipal building inspectors also had limited involvement: by law, once a building plan is approved, municipalities rely on the appointed professionals to supervise construction. The George Municipality confirmed that during construction, “the developer and his professional team” handle progress meetings and compliance, with “no input from the municipality” required unless called upon ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ). In this case, that meant the only oversight was supposed to come from the project’s own architect, engineers, and the NHBRC – none of whom effectively intervened before disaster struck.

These oversight failures point to not just negligence but potential corruption. The Human Settlements Minister’s report squarely blamed “a failure of our systems at NHBRC” – highlighting that if established procedures had been followed, the collapse could have been prevented (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen) (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). Indeed, she noted the NHBRC effectively “enabled [the contractor] to cut corners by not following our standard operating procedures and even approving [the project] without all necessary attachments”, creating the conditions for structural failure (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). Several NHBRC employees have since been implicated as complicit in these lapses (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). Disciplinary action was initiated against the NHBRC’s then-CEO for the oversight breakdown (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen), and two junior officials (who were on probation at the time of the approvals) were arrested and face charges of culpable homicide alongside the contractor (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). The NHBRC has produced a 250-page forensic investigation report, which details how its internal failings directly contributed to the collapse (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament).

Unauthorized Structural Modifications and Design Breaches

One of the most dangerous irregularities was the unauthorized change in the building’s design and scope without proper re-evaluation of structural adequacy. The project began as something very different from what it eventually became:

• Expansion from Approved Plan: The original building plan, as approved by the George Municipality on 6 July 2023, allowed for a multi-storey block of flats (reportedly five storeys plus a roof deck) ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ) ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ). However, it appears the execution of the project deviated even from those plans. The NHBRC enrollment was for only a single storey, indicating either a misrepresentation or a phased approach that was not formally authorized. As construction progressed, additional floors were added on the fly. This effectively meant structural elements designed (and approved) for a smaller building were now supporting a much heavier, taller structure than intended. The necessary recalculations and re-approval for this change were not done. Minister Simelane-Nkadimeng confirmed that the paperwork was later changed to reflect a multi-storey design, but by then construction was already well advanced (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). These “plan changes” were not duly processed through normal approval channels – they were unapproved modifications in practice (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen).

• Inadequate Structural Design and Materials: Because of the irregular planning, the building likely lacked a coherent, code-compliant structural design for the height it reached. The NHBRC’s investigation found that “structural designs were lacking” in the project file (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). It is unclear if the engineer ever produced a proper design for a five-storey structure or if calculations were done piecemeal as additional floors were added. What is clear is that something was gravely amiss in the structural integrity. Experts have pointed to a combination of factors typical in such failures: “poor designs, poor site investigations or poor construction” practices (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). In George, all three may have played a role. Witnesses noted problems in the foundation and lower columns (cracks, signs of stress) even before the upper floors were completed (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). This suggests the support structure was overstressed – likely because it was not originally intended (or properly reinforced) for the load of so many storeys. That aligns with the Minister’s summary: “processes were not followed in terms of the proper registration of the building and to ensure the structure…literally led to the collapse” (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament).

• On-Site Construction Irregularities: Alongside design flaws, the contractor’s implementation on site raised red flags. A stark example emerged of unqualified personnel performing critical work: a video surfaced showing a cleaning staff member mixing concrete for the building, instead of a skilled concrete worker (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). Using untrained labor for such technical tasks can lead to improper concrete mixes or poor quality construction. Liatel Developments acknowledged the video and said the allegation would be part of the investigations (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). Such cost-cutting measures – if a cleaner was indeed tasked with mixing structural concrete – illustrate the unsafe practices employed. This, combined with possible use of substandard construction methods, further weakened the building. (Notably, forensic tests on material samples after the collapse indicated the raw materials like cement and steel were of acceptable quality (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). Thus, it was likely the way they were used – e.g. insufficient reinforcement steel, inadequate curing of concrete, or other errors – that contributed to failure, rather than defective materials themselves.)

In summary, the contractor and project team made significant unauthorized structural modifications – essentially erecting a structure of a size and weight beyond what had been properly engineered or approved. Without a competent authority verifying these changes, the building became a ticking time bomb. A senior official would later remark that it was “a disaster waiting to happen,” with critical structural shortcomings present from the basement upwards (a fact known to some insiders but not acted upon) (George tragedy: Shocking claims emerge). The collapse was the tragic culmination of these compounded irregularities.

Diminished Role of the Architect as Principal Agent

A notable aspect of this project was the absence of the architect in the principal oversight role during construction. In South African construction practice, the principal agent (PA) is the professional who administers the building contract, coordinates the consultants, and overall ensures the client’s requirements and the design intent are properly executed. Often, the project’s architect fills this role, as architects are trained to oversee all aspects of building delivery, balancing aesthetics, function, and technical integrity. In the Neo Victoria development, however, the appointed principal agent was the structural engineering firm itself (Mitchell & Associates), not the architect (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com).

This arrangement meant that the usual system of checks and balances was compromised. Why does principal agent choice matter? Consider the following:

• Independence and Holistic Oversight: An architect-PA typically has no stake in any single technical aspect, allowing them to impartially coordinate between disciplines (architectural, structural, civil, mechanical, etc.) and flag concerns. In this case, the engineer serving as PA was essentially overseeing his own work (the structural design) as well as the contractor’s performance. There was no independent party ensuring that changes to the design were acceptable or that construction quality met the design specifications – roles an architect could have played. The architect of record, Deon van der Westhuizen Architects, was responsible for the initial design and obtaining plan approval ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ). But after that point, with the engineer in charge of contract administration, the architect’s involvement may have been minimal or purely advisory. According to the George Municipality, once plans were approved, the onus was on the “owner and developer, together with their professional team” to conduct site meetings and manage compliance, without needing to report to the municipality ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ). If the architect was sidelined in this team, an important layer of oversight was effectively removed.

• Handling of Changes: When the developer decided to add more storeys or alter structural components, an architect in the PA role would normally insist on revised drawings, re-calculation by the structural engineer, and submission of those revisions to authorities or at least written confirmation of safety. In the George project, changes were made without such protocol. It is unclear if the architect was even consulted about the switch from a single-storey enrollment to a multi-storey build. The principal agent – the engineer – appears to have proceeded with changes without seeking a formal re-approval of plans (aside from the late NHBRC paperwork adjustment). The lack of an assertive architectural voice to question, “Has the foundation and structure been properly designed for these extra floors?” was a missed safeguard.

• Contractual and Ethical Responsibility: All registered professionals (architects and engineers alike) carry a duty to uphold safety. The Architectural Profession Act (No. 44 of 2000) and the Engineering Profession Act (No. 46 of 2000) require professionals to only undertake work within their competence and to act with due care. In practice, an architect serving as PA would be expected to refuse to certify payments or stages of work that are non-compliant or dangerous. However, since the engineer was both designing and effectively self-certifying the stages, this critical peer-review element was lost. The result was that warnings signs (like structural cracks or deviations from approved plans) did not prompt a halt to construction. The architect on record, for his part, appears to have fulfilled his basic legal role of providing a design and getting it approved by the city ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ). The South African Council for the Architectural Profession (SACAP) later confirmed that the architect was duly registered and in good standing with the council, and that the building plans had been approved by authorities (SACAP). This implies the architect met his administrative obligations. However, the architect’s lack of active involvement on site post-approval – whether by contract design or due to being sidelined – meant an opportunity for independent oversight was lost. SACAP’s statement offered condolences but significantly did not describe any further role of the architect, other than to pledge cooperation with the investigation (SACAP) (SACAP).

In essence, the professional team structure itself was irregular. By deviating from the common model of having an architect or independent principal agent manage the project, the developer concentrated authority in the hands of the engineer and contractor. This not only may have overloaded the engineer with dual responsibilities, but also removed the healthy tension that can exist when an architect oversees a contractor with the power to report or rectify substandard work. It is a cautionary tale that even the best technical design requires independent oversight; no designer should inspect and approve his own work without external review. In George, the architect’s diminished role created a vacuum in which cutting corners went unchecked.

Professional Accountability: Engineers and the Engineering Council (ECSA)

The collapse raises serious questions about the conduct and accountability of the professionals involved – particularly the structural engineer, who was at the center of the project’s design and management. Under South African law, structural designs for buildings of this nature must be done or approved by a competent registered engineer, and that engineer is ethically and legally bound to ensure the design is safe for public use. Here, multiple failures of professional duty are evident, and the response of the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) is telling of deeper issues:

• Engineer’s Responsibilities: Atholl Mitchell, as the consulting structural/civil engineer, signed off on the building’s plans (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com), implicitly certifying that the structure would be sound. He was also the principal agent, responsible for overseeing execution. The expectation in such roles is that an engineer will “hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public” – a core tenet of ECSA’s Code of Conduct – and will refuse to authorize work that is non-compliant. If indeed the building’s structural supports were not sufficient for five storeys, it was incumbent on the engineer to reinforce them or halt construction. The fact that the project continued despite evident structural stress (cracking) suggests a dereliction of the engineer’s duty of care. It may be that the engineer’s original design was only for a smaller building and was never properly updated; allowing construction to proceed under those conditions is a grave professional fault. South Africa’s National Building Regulations also require the appointment of a “competent person (structures)” for buildings of this complexity, whose job is to design and inspect the structural elements and ultimately issue a completion certificate. If Mitchell or his firm held that role, they failed to exercise the required standard of care.

• ECSA’s Role and Initial Inaction: ECSA is the statutory body governing the engineering profession, tasked with registering engineers and technicians, and handling misconduct or incompetence through its disciplinary processes. In the wake of the collapse, ECSA sent investigators to the site to determine if professional negligence played a role (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). But notably, this was not the first time ECSA had interest in this engineer. It emerged that prior complaints had been lodged against Atholl Mitchell’s conduct on other projects. ECSA spokespersons confirmed that an earlier inquiry had been launched into a complaint about Mitchell’s work on building sites (dating back to a project in 2018–2019), but that “there was insufficient evidence… to prove transgression”, and thus no action was taken at that time (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com) (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ). In fact, as recently as February 2024 – just months before the George disaster – ECSA’s investigating committee had recommended charging Mitchell with various breaches of the code of conduct, according to reports (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ). However, the committee then found the evidence insufficient to sustain formal charges and effectively cleared him (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ). This implies that warning signs about this engineer’s practices were on ECSA’s radar, yet the outcome was inconclusive and he was allowed to continue practicing without sanction. Tragically, the George collapse occurred soon after, raising tough questions about whether the professional oversight system failed the public. As one media analysis put it, Mitchell’s history “raised questions about the engineering profession’s regulatory mechanisms” in preventing unfit practitioners from causing harm (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ).

• Post-Disaster Consequences for the Engineer: After the collapse, ECSA moved more decisively. While the full disciplinary outcome is pending, it was widely reported that the engineer’s registration was suspended pending investigation (to prevent him from practicing while the case is resolved) (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com). The Department of Public Works indicated that ECSA had an investigator examining “any factors of the engineering professionals associated with the development” for improper conduct (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). In practical terms, this means ECSA is determining whether Mitchell violated the code by approving unsound designs or practices. If found guilty, he could face severe penalties, up to being struck off the register (which would bar him from practicing) and potential criminal liability. Indeed, the South African Police Service opened a criminal case; currently the contractor (developer) and two NHBRC officials have been charged with culpable homicide (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen), and it would not be surprising if the engineer also faces charges or civil claims given his central role.

This case underscores the importance of enforcing professional accountability. Both architects and engineers must adhere to their councils’ codes and the law. Architects are expected to not sign off on buildings that violate regulations, and engineers must refuse to compromise structural safety under client pressure. In George, professional signatures were rendered meaningless by the individuals’ actions: having a registered engineer on paper did not prevent an unsafe structure, because the checks and balances relied too heavily on individual integrity without external enforcement. It took the collapse of a building and dozens of lives lost to trigger robust action from ECSA. The engineering council and other professional boards must reflect on why preventative enforcement (acting on earlier complaints, conducting random audits of high-risk projects, etc.) failed here. Stronger oversight of practitioners – ensuring that those who “cut corners” or flout standards are identified and corrected early – is clearly needed to uphold the credibility of the professions and to protect the public.

Other Contributing Irregularities

Several other systemic issues in the construction sector were highlighted by this tragedy:

• Contractor Registration Loopholes: It was revealed that Liatel Developments, the contractor building the project, was not registered with the Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com). The CIDB is a regulatory body that grades and registers contractors, primarily for public sector projects, to ensure they have the capacity and track record for contracts of various sizes. However, current legislation apparently did not require similar registration for private projects of this nature, a loophole that Minister of Public Works Sihle Zikalala flagged as problematic (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com). The lack of CIDB oversight meant that a relatively unknown or unproven contractor could take on a complex multi-storey build without any competency vetting by authorities. Inexperience or lack of capacity on the part of the builder could have contributed to poor workmanship and safety lapses. This regulatory gap – between public and private project requirements – is now in the spotlight, with calls to extend certain mandatory registration and grading requirements to all large construction works to prevent unqualified contractors from literally getting in over their heads.

• Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Oversight: The Department of Employment and Labour was involved after the collapse, as any construction site incident falls under occupational safety jurisdiction. Labour inspectors would investigate compliance with the Construction Regulations (e.g. was there a safety plan, were workers trained, etc.). While the root cause here was structural, the high number of casualties may also point to insufficient safety measures like emergency planning or the structural collapse being so sudden that normal precautions (scaffolding safety, etc.) were irrelevant. The Labour Minister, Thulas Nxesi, noted difficulty even contacting the developer in the immediate aftermath (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian), hinting at a possibly disorganized site management. Additionally, many workers were immigrants, some possibly undocumented, which can complicate both safety oversight and post-accident support (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian) (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian). Ensuring that all construction workers, regardless of origin, are accounted for and working under safe conditions is another systemic challenge that the George collapse brought to light (e.g. there were initial discrepancies in knowing how many people were on site, partly due to informal employment practices) (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian) (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ).

• Delayed Victim Compensation: One year on, a tragic epilogue has been the struggle of survivors and victims’ families to receive compensation for their losses. Under South African law, injured workers or the dependents of those killed on the job are entitled to compensation from the state’s Compensation Fund (established by the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, COIDA). In this case, “the survivors and family members of the deceased are entitled to payouts from the Compensation Fund”, yet none had received any payment almost a year later

In sum, the George collapse has served as a painful case study exposing how multiple layers of irregularities – from administrative corner-cutting and corruption, to professional negligence, to weak enforcement of both construction and labor protections – can intersect to produce a deadly outcome. It has been a wake-up call for South Africa’s construction industry and regulators, prompting inquiries at the highest levels. A preliminary report by the NHBRC (as presented to Parliament) made it abundantly clear: “several procedures were not followed” and laws were ignored in this project.

Recommendations for Regulatory Reform and Professional Practice

In light of the systemic failures revealed by the George building collapse, a multi-pronged approach is needed to prevent future tragedies. The following recommendations target regulatory bodies, professional councils, and industry practices:

• Strengthen NHBRC Oversight and Integrity: The NHBRC must overhaul its processes to ensure that no project slips through without full compliance. This includes implementing technical safeguards on its IT systems so that approvals cannot be bypassed or manipulated by rogue staff (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). Internal audit trails and dual-signature requirements for critical approvals could deter individual collusion. The NHBRC should also enforce strict enrollment criteria: for multi-storey or complex buildings, require detailed structural plans before approval. A dedicated team of structural engineers within NHBRC (or external reviewers) should vet these plans for adequacy (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament) (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament). Moreover, regular site inspections must be non-negotiable for high-risk projects. The council should conduct stage inspections (foundations, each floor, etc.) and document each visit. If developers don’t allow inspections or deviate from approved plans, NHBRC must have power to issue stop-work orders. Essentially, the NHBRC’s mandate to protect housing consumers should be fully exercised – no more rubber-stamping. Where internal failures occur, swift disciplinary action (as was initiated against the CEO and staff in this case) should set an example (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen). Restoring the NHBRC’s credibility is critical, as the industry must know that corners cannot be cut without consequence.

• Close Legislative Loopholes for Contractors: Government should extend regulatory requirements like CIDB registration to private developments above a certain size or value. If Liatel Developments had been subject to CIDB grading, its lack of capacity or experience for a five-storey build might have been flagged (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com). At minimum, private clients should be encouraged or required to hire contractors who are CIDB-registered, as this provides some assurance of their track record. Policymakers can amend the CIDB Act or related regulations to remove the exemption for purely private projects, especially for multi-storey residential buildings which house many people (and thus pose a public safety concern, not just a private risk). Additionally, the Construction Regulations under the OHS Act could be tightened to mandate that only contractors with proven competence (through registration or accreditation) engage in structural building work beyond a certain scale. This would elevate the baseline quality and safety culture among builders in the sector.

• Empower Municipal Building Control: Local authorities should not assume that an approved plan and appointed professionals guarantee a safe build. Municipal building control departments could institute interim inspections for large projects – for example, verifying foundations and structural frames at certain heights. While current law may not demand developers submit progress reports to the municipality ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ), municipalities can proactively request updates or perform random site visits especially if a project’s scope changes. If a building is visibly growing beyond what was approved, enforcement officers should intervene. In George, construction started even before the plan approval was finalized (construction began 3 July 2023, plan approved 6 July) – a clear violation that local enforcement could have caught if they had mechanisms to detect unpermitted work (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen) ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ). Improved coordination between planning approval and actual site activity (e.g. leveraging drones or community reporting of construction activity) can help catch early infractions. Ultimately, revisiting the National Building Regulations to give municipalities more teeth in monitoring building progress – without overly burdening them – could be beneficial. For instance, a requirement that the “competent person (structural engineer)” submit a formal progress and compliance certificate at defined stages to the municipality would create a paper trail and personal accountability at each milestone, rather than all at the end.

• Reassert the Role of the Principal Agent (Architect or Independent Professional): The industry should heed the lesson that having an independent principal agent is a safety net. Developers should be guided (even through regulation or contractual norms) to appoint a qualified, unbiased principal agent who is not the same person as the lead consulting engineer or contractor. While engineers can certainly manage projects, the separation of design and oversight duties is healthy for risk management. Professional bodies and client organizations (like property developers associations) can develop guidelines recommending that the principal agent be an architectural professional or a project manager who oversees compliance holistically. If an engineer is appointed as PA, then perhaps an independent auditing architect or engineer should be periodically brought in to review the project. Contract forms (like the JBCC) might be updated to emphasize the PA’s duty to report any client/contractor deviations that could compromise safety, and to empower them to suspend work if necessary. In essence, encourage a culture where architects remain involved through construction. Their training in seeing the “big picture” complements the engineer’s detail focus. In the George case, had the architect been fully in charge of contract administration, he might have raised alarms about structural changes or at least demanded proper documentation for them. Going forward, architects and engineers in South Africa should also foster stronger collaboration: architects must educate clients that value engineering or changes need re-approval from engineers; engineers must inform architects of any concerns with the design as executed. Restoring a team approach with clear accountability can help ensure that no single point of failure (like one compromised engineer) leads to disaster.

• Enhance Professional Council Proactivity (ECSA and SACAP): ECSA in particular must draw lessons from this incident to reform its investigative and disciplinary processes. Timely action on complaints is essential – if an engineer has multiple complaints, even if each individually lacks smoking-gun evidence, the pattern should prompt closer monitoring or conditional license renewal. ECSA could institute a system to flag practitioners who are the subject of repeated or serious allegations and perform technical audits of their ongoing projects. The fact that ECSA’s investigating committee initially “found insufficient evidence” against the George engineer despite earlier recommendations to charge him (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ) suggests possibly an overly rigid standard of proof or slow procedure. Legal due process is important, but the council’s mandate is to protect the public from professional malpractice. Thus, suspension pending inquiry (as was done post-collapse) should be used more liberally in cases where public safety could be at immediate risk. Likewise, SACAP should ensure that architects are not abdicating their responsibilities during construction. Both councils can also increase continuing professional development (CPD) requirements focusing on ethics and safety. Professionals should be reminded that signing off on incomplete designs or acquiescing to client pressure violates their code of conduct. The councils might also collaborate with the Department of Labour to have a presence or insight on major construction sites, creating a bridge between OHS enforcement and professional oversight. Another idea is establishing a whistleblower channel where professionals who feel overruled by clients (e.g. an architect who is replaced or an engineer asked to cut corners) can confidentially alert the councils or authorities before a disaster happens.

• Improve Transparency and Public Accountability: The public outcry in George for answers highlights the need for openness in investigations. Going forward, when a structural collapse or major building failure occurs, authorities should commit to releasing investigation reports and recommendations in full, and in a timely manner. This transparency will bolster trust and allow the wider industry to learn from mistakes. In the George case, there were delays in releasing the NHBRC’s full report, leading to frustration among victims’ families and the community (10 months later, where is the full George Building collapse report?) (10 months later, where is the full George Building collapse report?). Such delays should be minimized; even interim findings (like the “several procedures were not followed” statement).

• Expedite and Reform Compensation Mechanisms: While not directly related to preventing collapses, taking care of victims is a moral and professional obligation for the industry and state. The Compensation Fund’s dysfunction must be addressed at a policy level – the Department of Employment and Labour should streamline claims from construction accidents, possibly by creating a fast-track for mass casualty events. In the interim, insurance requirements for developers and contractors could be revisited. For example, mandating a form of construction liability insurance or a “contractor’s all-risk” policy that specifically covers worker injuries and third-party damages could provide an additional safety net. If such insurance was in place, claims could potentially be paid out faster than the Compensation Fund’s process. Industry associations (Master Builders South Africa, for instance) might also consider establishing emergency relief funds for workers affected by construction disasters. For professionals, this is a reminder to advise clients on proper insurance – an area often neglected until tragedy strikes. Ultimately, ensuring swift compensation and support for victims is part of the accountability chain; it reinforces the seriousness with which the industry treats the lives of those who build and use our structures.

• Cultivate a Culture of Safety and Ethics: Regulations and enforcement can only go so far if the on-site culture is to take shortcuts. All stakeholders – developers, contractors, professionals, and workers – need to embrace that building safety is non-negotiable. This means rejecting “irregular” practices such as hiring unqualified people for critical work, proceeding with unapproved plan changes, or ignoring warning signs. Clients and developers must be educated that hiring cheaper, unregistered contractors or bypassing professionals will likely cost far more in the long run (as the George case grimly illustrates). The industry should amplify training on construction ethics: for example, include modules on ethical decision-making in both architectural and engineering licensure exams and CPD. Workers should be empowered to speak up if they see something unsafe, without fear of losing their jobs. Whistleblower protections in the construction sector could be strengthened, so that an employed engineer or site foreman who notices dangerous deviations can alert authorities. Additionally, success stories of projects that did things “by the book” and still achieved budget and schedule targets could be publicized to counter the perception that regulations are just red tape. Ultimately, a collective commitment is needed: every project stakeholder must internalize that the cost of one collapse – in lives, in reputational damage, in legal liability – far outweighs any savings from cutting corners.

Conclusion

The 2024 George building collapse tragically demonstrated how irregular activities and systemic failures in the construction sector can converge into disaster. In this case, an array of preventable mistakes – from a lax regulatory council that approved incomplete submissions, to a contractor and engineer who ignored the limits of the structure, to the marginalization of the architect’s oversight role – created a perfect storm of failure. The incident underscores that building safety in South Africa is not just the responsibility of one party; it requires diligence from regulators, ethical conduct from professionals, and vigilance in enforcement at all levels. The loss of 34 lives is a stark reminder that **compromising on standards has real, horrific consequences ([

Going forward, the country’s built environment professionals and authorities must treat this as a watershed moment. Implementing the recommendations above – strengthening oversight, clarifying responsibilities, enhancing accountability, and fostering a culture of compliance – will be crucial to restore confidence and ensure such a tragedy does not happen again. As the investigations have shown, the George collapse was not a random accident but the product of human lapses. Therefore, by addressing those lapses head-on, South Africa can honor the memory of those who perished by vastly improving the safety of its construction industry. This case study will likely be studied in engineering and architecture circles for years to come as a cautionary tale. Let it also serve as a catalyst for positive change, prompting every stakeholder in the built environment to recommit to the fundamental principle that structures are “not built with the purpose to collapse” (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’) – they must be built to protect and preserve life, above all else.

Sources:

• Eyewitness News (EWN) – Lindsay Dentlinger, “NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament,” 4 April 2025 (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament) (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament) (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament) (NHBRC’s lapses that led to George building collapse laid bare in Parliament).

• The Citizen – Jarryd Westerdale, “George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings,” 4 April 2025 (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen) (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen) (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen) (George building collapse: Minister details investigation findings | The Citizen).

• The Citizen – Daniel Steyn (GroundUp), “Still no compensation for victims of George building collapse,” 2 April 2025 ([ Still no compensation for victims of George building collapse | GroundUp ](https://groundup.news/article/george-building-victims-yet-to-receive-workers-compensation/#:~:text=compensation%20under%20the%20Compensation%20for,COIDA)) ([ Still no compensation for victims of George building collapse | GroundUp ](https://groundup.news/article/george-building-victims-yet-to-receive-workers-compensation/#:~:text=,matter%20is%20still%20under%20investigation)).

• Daily Maverick (via AllAfrica) – Marianne Thamm, “George building consultant previously faced an Engineering Council probe…” 14 May 2024 (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com) (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com) (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com).

• Mail & Guardian – Umamah Bakharia, “George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’,” 16 May 2024 (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian) (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian) (George building collapse: Firm ‘working with the authorities’ – The Mail & Guardian).

• George Herald – Alida de Beer, “Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained,” 10 May 2024 ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ) ( Erf 15098 application process for ill-fated Neo Victoria flats explained | George Herald ).

• SACAP (Press Release) – “SACAP extends condolences to families affected by the building collapse in George,” 13 May 2024 (SACAP) (SACAP).

• The Citizen – staff reporter, “Engineer investigated just months before tragedy,” 10 May 2024 (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ) (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ) (Engineering entity investigated engineer prior to building collapse ).

• GroundUp – Nathan Geffen, “Construction company not registered with CIDB” (via Business & Human Rights Resource Centre), 15 May 2024 (South Africa: George Building Consultant Previously Faced an Engineering Council Probe, but Evidence Insufficient to Prove Transgression – allAfrica.com).

• Additional reporting from EWN, Moneyweb, and SABC News on the George collapse and its aftermath ([ Still no compensation for victims of George building collapse | GroundUp ](https://groundup.news/article/george-building-victims-yet-to-receive-workers-compensation/#:~:text=A%20criminal%20case%20is%20being,and%20laws%20not%20adhered%20to)) ([Still no compensation for victims of George building collapse](https://www.facebook.com/newzimbabwecom/posts/still-no-compensation-for-victims-of-george-building-collapse-the-collapse-of-a-/1107691854724384/?locale=sw_KE#:~:text=Still%20no%20compensation%20for%20victims,but%20have%20not%20received%20anything)).

SOURCE:Blueprints of Disaster: What the George Collapse Reveals About South African Construction – ARCHITECT AFRICA ONLINE

[Author]

Posts